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INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN PATENT
INFRINGEMENT SUITS
To enable a patentee to protect his "right to exclude others from mak-
ing, using, or selling" 1 his invention, Congress has granted him a "remedy
by civil action for infringement" 2 in the federal courts. During the course
of litigation, these courts "may grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent,
on such terms as the court deems reasonable," 3 including temporary relief
to the patentee.
4
The granting of temporary injunctive relief on the basis of incomplete
facts may often settle the ultimate issues immediately and cause irreparable
injury to the enjoined party.5 If a temporary injunction is unwarranted, a
few years will probably elapse before final determination that the injunction
was improvidently granted.6  By this time, the alleged infringer's loss of
competitive advantage over the patentee may be incapable of repair by
money damages.7 On the other hand, irreparable injury may befall the
charging party if the temporary injunction is not issued. For example, the
delay until trial on the merits can encourage willful infringement of a patent
near its expiration date, irreparably injuring a patentee by shortening his
patent's effective life.8 A similar effect occurs if the patent's primary utility
lies in its first few years of existence.
The American patent system gives all inventors the same "reward" of
a seventeen year monopoly irrespective of the extent of contribution or the
stimulus needed to induce invention or exploitation. Courts must grant or
deny injunctions for the entire term even if their own political and economic
predilections favor a standard of invention that would result in fewer patent
monopolies.9 This judicial dilemma may at times lead to unnecessary in-
135 U.S.C. § 154 (1958).
235 U.S.C. § 281 (1958).
335 U.S.C. § 283 (1958).
4 See generally 3 ROBINSON, PATENTS §§ 1168-1220 (1890) ; 3 WALKER, PATENTS
§§ 765-820 (Deller's ed. 1937, Supp. 1963) ; Note, The Enforcement of Rights Against
Patent Infringers, 72 HARv. L. REv. 328, 339-43 (1958).
5 See ibid.; cf. Note, Temporary Injunctive Relief Under Section 10(l) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 460 (1963).
6 A Senate subcommittee study showed that in fiscal 1959 the median time from
filing of complaint to trial in 86 federal districts was 15.3 months, and in the
Southern District of New York, where many patent infringement suits are brought,
the time was 26.7 months. The time between issue and trial was on the average 10.3
months in these same 86 districts, and 19.1 in the Southern District. STAFF OF
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICI-




9 Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 649, 661-71
(1947).
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validation of patents, ostensibly to protect the public despite injury to the
patentee.' At the very least, the overplay of political and economic con-
siderations in this "all or nothing" determination of the standard and scope
of invention impedes adjudication of applications for permanent injunctive
relief and to a lesser degree also interferes with consideration of applica-
tions for temporary relief. Over the last one and one-half centuries the
broad equitable power possessed by the federal judiciary and manifested
in unchanging articulated requirements for temporary and permanent in-
junctive relief" has masked broad shifts in the standards applied, possibly
reflecting economic and political currents within the judiciary and the com-
munity as a whole.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Obedient to the constitutional mandate "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries," 12 the first Congress authorized the granting of patents.'
3
Congress, however, did not originally provide a forum for equitable en-
forcement of patent rights.' 4 Therefore, the federal courts encountered
jurisdictional limitations on their exercise of ordinary equitable powers in
favor of patentees.15 To alleviate these difficulties, Congress passed the
Patent Act of 1819, granting the federal courts "upon any bill in equity
[the] . . . authority to grant injunctions, according to the course and
principles of courts of equity . . . on such terms and conditions as the
said courts may deem fit and reasonable." 16 Despite myriad changes in
other areas of the patent laws, the federal equity jurisdiction over injunctive
relief has remained essentially unchanged since its enactment.
II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIvE RELIEF AGAINST INFRINGERS
A. The Early Standards
The grant or denial of temporary injunctive relief depends upon the
court's "sound discretion." This judgment in turn requires consideration
of the comparative injuries to the parties if relief is granted or withheld
until the completion of trial.' 7 However, courts must first isolate the ele-
ments requisite to permanent injunctive relief in order to assess the prob-
I' See id. at 667.
11 See Bump, Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Cases, 5 CENT. L.J. 418 (1877)
Note, The Enforcement of Rights Against Patent Infringers, 72 HARV. L. REV. 328
(1958).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
13 Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, §§ 1-7, 1 Stat. 109.
14 See 3 WALKER, PATENTS § 538 (Deller's ed. 1937).
15 See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 15 Fed. Cas. 697 (No. 8420) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1811).
16Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481-82 (1819), as amended.
37 See Rice & Adams Corp. v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509, 514 (1929).
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ability of the applicant's success at trial. By mid-nineteenth century the
generally recognized elements included the applicant's title to the patent,
the patent's validity, and its infringement by the defendant.18 But the
minimum quantum of proof required for each of these elements to support
injunctive relief was not yet settled.
1. Title
Since establishment of title is usually not a difficult process, courts
insisted on a clear showing-in effect, they applied a "no reasonable doubt"
standard. Title was ordinarily ascertainable directly from the letters patent
or from an assignment to the plaintiff; 19 some courts also construed con-
flicting documents, if necessary, to resolve reasonably simple factual disputes
of title.20
2. Validity
The most persuasive evidence of validity, if a "no reasonable doubt"
test were applied, was an adjudication of the patent's validity in a prior
adversary proceeding.2 ' Although not guaranteeing an ultimate holding
of the patent's validity as between the present parties, prior adjudication of
validity is the result of a full court hearing, including thorough examination
of the relevant prior art. However, since validity, as well as infringe-
ment, is ordinarily not so readily ascertainable, courts also accepted tests
less restrictive than the "no reasonable doubt" standard to evaluate these
elements at preliminary injunction proceedings. A sufficient demonstration
of public acquiescence in the invention might support a presumption of
validity on the ground that informed members of the public acted as though
the patent were valid.22  Two common factual situations establishing
acquiescence were that no competitors challenged the patentee's continued
profitable trade in the patented process or articlem or that for a long period
all makers, users, and sellers of the device operated only under license from
the patentee.24 Accepting a patent's validity on the basis of. public
acquiescence can at most be described as "reasonable cause to believe" the
18 See Bump, supra note 11, at 418.
19 See Mowry v. Grand St. & N.R.R., 17 Fed. Cas. 937 (No. 9893) (C.C.E.D.
N.Y. 1872) (dictum); 3 RoBiNsoN, PATENTS § 1190 (1890); cf. Waterman v. Mac-
Kenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891) (exclusive license).
20 See Clum v. Brewer, 5 Fed. Cas. 1097, 1102 (No. 2909) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855).
21 See Potter v. Muller, 19 Fed. Cas. 1170, 1171 (No. 11334) (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1864); Orr v. Littlefield, 18 Fed. Cas. 837, 839 (No. 10590) (C.C.D.N.H. 1845).
22 See Goodyear v. Central R.R., 10 Fed. Gas. 664, 666 (No. 5563) (C.C.D.N.J.
1853).
23 Sargent v. Seagrave, 21 Fed. Cas. 505 (No. 12365) (C.C.D.R.I. 1855)
(patentee made and sold 105,000 patented machines in 2 year period); Foster v.
Moore, 9 Fed. Cas. 563 (No. 4978) (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (patentee made and sold
150 patented machines in 8 year period).
24 See Thompson Elec. Welding Co. v. Two Rivers Mfg. Co., 63 Fed. 120
(C.C.E.D. Wis. 1894); Hat-Sweat Mfg. Co. v. Davis Sewing Mach. Co., 32 Fed.
481 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1887); cf. Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co. v. Williams, 11
Fed. Cas. 83, 84-85 (No. 5847) (D. Mass. 1860) (dictum).
1028 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:1025
patent's validity, since commercial success, even when combined with
abstention of others from the field, does not directly substantiate the elusive
quality of invention essential to a valid patent 2 5 This test also ignores
substantive defenses to validity that the defendant might successfully raise
upon trial.
2 6
Only in rare instances did the courts look beyond prior adjudication or
public acquiescence for evidence of validity. Occasionally they granted
patentees preliminary relief if examination of the overall circumstances
revealed unethical or inequitable conduct by the alleged infringer.27 But a
sufficient showing of validity always demanded more than mere exhibition
of the letters patent.
28
3. Infringement
A common judicial verbalization of a sufficient preliminary showing of
defendant's infringement was that infringement must be "clear." 29 To
achieve this result the court first had to determine the scope of the plaintiff's
patent, either by relying upon the construction given it in a prior adjudica-
tion,30 or, if none were available, upon the court's own possibly superficial
evaluation.3 ' The court then had to decide whether the defendant infringed
this construction of the plaintiff's patent.32 These determinations frequently
entailed complex interpretations of conflicting affidavits 33 and left room
for doubt that the interpretations would be sustained after full development
of expert testimony and other' evidence at the ultimate trial upon the merits.
Thus, to establish infringement for the purposes of preliminary relief, the
courts required only a showing that gave them "reasonable cause to believe"
the plaintiff's claim.
4. Irreparable Injury
Once the complainant established the elements of a prima facie case,
34
the court still had to decide whether he was entitled to preliminary injunc-
25 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1958).
26 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1958) (domestic and foreign anticipation; patentee
not actual inventor).
27 See Sickels v. Mitchell, 22 Fed. Cas. 74 (No. 12835) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1857).
28 See Edward Barr Co. v. New York & New Haven Automatic Sprinkler Co.,
32 Fed. 79 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887); Booth v. Garelly, 3 Fed. Cas. 883 (No. 1646)
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1847).
2 See, e.g., Allis v. Stowell, 15 Fed. 242 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1883) (injunction
denied); Cross v. Livermore, 9 Fed. 607 (C.C.D.R.I. 1881) (injunction denied);
Kirby Bung Mfg. Co. v. White, 1 Fed. 604 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1880) (injunction denied);
cf. Standard Elevator Co. v. Crane Elevator Co., 56 Fed. 718 (7th Cir. 1893).
30 See Mallory Mfg. Co. v. Hickok, 20 Fed. 116 (C.C.D. Conn. 1884). But see
Many v. Sizer, 16 Fed. Cas. 690 (No. 9057) (C.C.D. Mass. 1849).
31 See Coburn v. Clark, 15 Fed. 804 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1883); Clum v. Brewer,
5 Fed. Cas. 1097 (No. 2909) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855).
32 See Many v. Sizer, 16 Fed. Cas. 690 (No. 9057) (C.C.D. Mass. 1849).
33 See Blanchard v. Reeves, 3 Fed. Cas. 638 (No. 1515) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850);
Gibson v. Van Dresar, 10 Fed. Cas. 329 (No. 5402) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1850) ; cf. Morse
Fountain Pen Co. v. Esterbrook Steel Pen Mfg. Co., 17 Fed. Cas. 875 (No. 9862)
(C.C.D.N.J. 1869).
34 See 3 WALK.ER, op. cit. supra note 14, § 773.
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tive relief. The customary equity test for preliminary relief involved bal-
ancing plaintiff's probable success at trial on the merits against the likely
injuries to plaintiff, if he were denied relief until final trial, and to defend-
ant, if immediate relief were granted.3 5 However, in patent litigation many
courts automatically preserved statutory patent monopolies by assuming
that the irreparable injury requisite to a preliminary injunction necessarily
followed a finding of "reasonable cause to believe" that defendant infringed
plaintiff's valid patent.3 6 The rigidity of this approach was mitigated by
many courts only if the defendant could establish affirmatively that the
plaintiff would not suffer irreparable injury until the final trial-for ex-
ample, by a showing that infringement did not harm plaintiff in light of
the manner in which plaintiff was using the monopoly. The defendant
might then be given the alternative of posting a bond to cover possible
damages against him.3 7 Courts have taken this approach upon finding that
the plaintiff had relinquished exclusive control by licensing his patent to
others 38 or that he intended not to use his patent except to keep it from
others 3 9 Moreover, some courts even seemed to adopt the traditional
equity balance of convenience or comparative injury rationale 40 of con-
sidering not only the impact on the plaintiff if the injunction were denied,
but also the harm to the defendant if it were granted.41 However, in this
early period the strong disposition to grant preliminary injunctions when-
35 See 1 HIGH, INJUNCTIONS § 13 (4th ed. 1905); 4 PoimiERoy, EQUITY JuRIS-
PRUDENCE §§ 1359, 1359a (5th ed. 1941) ; McKean, The Balance of Convenience Doc-
trine, 39 DICK. L. Rxv. 211 (1935).
36 See, e.g., Hussey v. Whitely, 12 Fed. Cas. 1067 (No. 6950) (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1860); Ely v. Monson & B. Mfg. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. 604 (No. 4431) (C.C.D. Mass.
1860) ; Sickels v. Mitchell, 22 Fed. Cas. 74 (No. 12835) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1857) ; Sickels
v. Tileston, 22 Fed. Cas. 77 (No. 12837) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1857) ; Gibson v. Van Dresser,
10 Fed. Cas. 329 (No. 5402) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1850); Conover v. Mers, 6 Fed. Cas.
322 (No. 3123) (S.D.N.Y. 1868).
37 See American Middlings Purifier Co. v. Christian, i Fed. Cas. 683 (No. 307)
(C.C.D. Minn. 1877); Forbush v. Bradford, 9 Fed. Cas. 422 (No. 4930) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1858). Compare American Middlings Purifier Co. v. Atlantic Milling Co.,
1 Fed. Cas. 675 (No. 305) (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1877).
38 See Howe v. Morton, 12 Fed. Cas. 663, 670 (No. 6769) (C.C.D. Mass. 1860);
cf. Colgate v. Gold & Stock Tel. Co., 6 Fed. Cas. 76, 81 (No. 2991) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1879); Hodge v. Hudson R.R., 12 Fed. Cas. 276, 278 (No. 6560) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1868).
39 See How v. Boston Daily Advertiser Corp., 14 Fed. 914 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883).
See also Hoe v. Knap, 27 Fed. 204, 212 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886) ; Dorsey Harvester
Revolving Rake Co. v. Marsh, 7 Fed. Cas. 939, 945 (No. 4014) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1873).
40 See, e.g., Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co. v. Bussing, 10 Fed. Cas. 348 (No. 5416)
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875); Dorsey Revolving Harvester Rake Co. v. Bradley Mfg. Co.,
7 Fed. Cas. 946 (No. 4015) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1874); Morris v. Lowell Mfg. Co., 17
Fed. Cas. 946 (No. 4015) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1874); Morris v. Lowell Mfg. Co., 17
Fed. Cas. 822 (No. 9833) (C.C.D. Mass. 1866); Essex Hosiery Mfg. Co. v. Dorr
Mfg. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. 791 (No. 4533) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846); cf. Morris v. Shel-
bourne, 17 Fed. Cas. 829 (No. 9836) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1871).
41 For example, the infringing machinery may contain many costly parts not
covered by the plaintiff's patent. See Stainthorp v. Humiston, 22 Fed. Cas. 1035
(No. 13280) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1862) ; Howe v. Morton, 12 Fed. Cas. 663 (No. 6769)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1860). But see Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. v. Burton Stock-Car
Co., 70 Fed. 619, 621 (C.C.D. fe. 1895). See also Guidet v. Palmer, 11 Fed. Cas.
105 (No. 5859) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1872) (public interest against enjoining defendant's
use of patent).
1964]
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ever the court had "reasonable cause to believe" that plaintiff would succeed
in the final trial usually relegated the traditional equity investigation of
potential harms in patent infringement suits to the determination of whether
to order an injunction or the giving of a bond.
B. Shifts in the Application of Nineteenth Century Standards
1. Early Twentieth Century
During the first few decades of the twentieth century, the required
showing for preliminary injunctive relief remained couched in terms of
title, validity, infringement, and irreparable injury. But many courts began
to demand a greater quantum of proof for each of these elements before
granting preliminary relief. This shift is highlighted in City of Grand
Rapids v. Warren Bros.42  The defendants argued that the general trend
of authorities compelled a denial of a preliminary injunction or bond
because the previously adjudicated patent had not been clearly infringed,
and therefore every element of plaintiff's claim was not "so clear that the
court can entertain no doubt on the subject." 43 The court, while recog-
nizing growing support in other circuits for defendant's position,4 never-
theless held that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief of bond under
traditional equity principles, although there was at most "reasonable cause
to believe" that defendant infringed.
The retention of the nineteenth century "reasonable cause to believe"
standard in Grand Rapids received no support in other circuits.45 They
instead continued to strengthen the requirements of proof toward a "no
reasonable doubt" standard. Thus, although a prior adjudication still
sufficed to establish validity,46 plaintiffs often could not sustain validity upon
a public acquiescence theory simply by showing that they had practiced
the invention for a few years with commercial success and without com-
petition. Courts now required a clear showing of public acquiescence-
amounting to proof that the industry needed the device but did not adopt
it in deference to the plaintiff's patent.47 The courts also increased the
42 196 Fed. 892 (6th Cir. 1912).
43Id. at 894. (Emphasis added.) The defendant's argument continued that
upon requisite proof of title, validity, and infringement the injunction must issue
regardless of irreparable injury in order to maintain the statutory monopoly. Ibid.
44 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Earl, 82 Fed. 690, 691 (9th Cir. 1897) (dictum);
cf. Blount v. Societe Anonyme Du Filtre Chamberland Systeme Pasteur, 53 Fed. 98
(6th Cir. 1892) (question concerning infringement; complainant more likely to be
irreparably injured than alleged infringer; injunction granted).
45 See cases cited notes 46-48 infra.
46 See, e.g., Fireball Gas Tank & Illuminating Co. v. Commercial Acetylene Co.,
198 Fed. 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1912) ; General Elec. Co. v. Minneapolis Elec. Lamp Co.,
10 F.2d 851 (D. Minn. 1924).
47 See Adam v. Folger, 120 Fed. 260, 261-62 (7th Cir. 1903); American Coat
Pad Co. v. Phoenix Pad Co., 113 Fed. 629 (4th Cir. 1902) (alternative holding);
Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Phillip Carey Mfg. Co., 110 Fed. 747 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1901). But cf. Crescent Specialty Co. v. National Fireworks Distrib. Co., 219 Fed.
130 (6th Cir. 1915) (injunction granted, no bond, with "fair probability" of validity
of patent on substantial public acquiescence). See also Packard Paper Box Co. v.
0. B. Andrews Co., 67 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1933).
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necessary showing of infringement by requiring that it also be clearly
proved.48  The effect was a greater judicial reluctance to determine from
conflicting affidavits the patent's scope and the likelihood that defendant
infringed it. However, the shift to more stringent standards was confined
to the elements of title, validity, and infringement. A presumption of
irreparable injury, based on the notion of uncritically preserving the
statutory monopoly, still frequently followed as of course once plaintiff
established the first three elements of his claim.49 Courts accordingly be-
came increasingly hesitant to let defendants substitute bond for injunction.r°
Another trend, suggested in a few prior cases, 51 but contrary to the
general tightening of standards for preliminary relief, appeared during this
period. In Boyce v. Stewart-Warner Speedometer Corp.,52 the patentee
charged the defendant with infringement but, due to the patent's recent
issuance, could establish validity by neither prior adjudication nor public
acquiescence. 53  However, the defendant's device was an obvious copy of
the plaintiff's patented product; the court found "no doubt" -4 that the
plaintiff's patent was valid and issued a preliminary injunction. Therefore,
the plaintiff, presenting a case of "no reasonable doubt" on the issues of
title, infringement, and irreparable injury, sustained his right to an in-
junction, although he showed only that his patent was "more probably than
not" valid, this presumption of validity flowing from the unattended letters
patent.55 The copying itself probably did not have a sufficiently close
resemblance to "palming off" to support an independent charge of unfair
4 8 See, e.g., A. B. Dick Co. v. Barnett, 277 Fed. 423 (2d Cir. 1921); Layne v.
Getty, 222 Fed. 917 (5th Cir. 1915) (per curiam); Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss
Co., 180 Fed. 110 (2d Cir. 1910) (per curiam); Summerhays v. Scheu Mfg. Co.,
47 F.2d 945 (S.D. Cal. 1930); Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. United States
Light & Heat Corp., 233 Fed. 1007 (W.D.N.Y. 1916). See also Anderson & Writer
Corp. v. Hanky Beret, Inc., 40 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1930), reversing 36 F.2d 412 (S.D.
N.Y. 1929) (lower court found a "clear infringement").
49 See, e.g., Hilditch v. American Bumper Corp., 15 F.2d 451 (E.D.N.Y. 1926);
General Elec. Co. v. Wise, 119 Fed. 922 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1903). But cf. Landis Tool
Co. v. Ingle, 286 Fed. 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1923). See also United States Gypsum v. Best-
wall M g. Co., 290 Fed. 800, 801 (7th Cir. 1923).
50o Very few cases during this period granted a bond in lietu of injunction. See
Interurban Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 186 Fed. 166
(6th Cir. 1911) (patent only had short time to run). But see Toledo Plate & Window
Glass Co. v. Kawneer Mfg. Co., 262 Fed. 510 (6th Cir. 1920); Universal Gypsum
& Lime Co. v. Haggerty, 21 F.2d 544 (W.D.N.Y. 1927).
51 See Edward Barr Co. v. New York & New Havea Automatic Sprinkler Co.,
32 Fed. 79 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887); Sickels v. Mitchell, 22 Fed. Cas. 74 (No. 12835)
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1857).
52220 Fed. 118 (2d Cir. 1914).
53 See also McMaster v. Daugherty Mfg. Co., 219 Fed. 219 (3d Cir. 1914);
Standard Typewriter Co. v. Standard Folding Typewriter Sales Co., 181 Fed. 500
(2d Cir. 1910); Lambert Snyder Vibrator Co. v. Marvel Vibrator Co., 138 Fed. 82
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1905).
5 Boyce v. Stewart-Warner Speedometer Corp., 220 Fed. 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1914).
55 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1958) : "A patent shall be presumed valid. The burden
of establishing invalidity of a patent shall rest on a party asserting it." In a, pre-
liminary injunction hearing this provision allows the plaintiff to succeed on the issue
of validity only if the defendant does not contest. See Stewart Stamping Corp. v.
Westchester Prods. Co., 119 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also Westinghouse
Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U. S. 342, 348 (1924)..
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competition.5" Moreover, even obvious infringement of a patent "pays no
tribute to its validity, however much it concedes utility . . . ., Only
the equities of the Boyce situation could have moved the court to ignore the
usual requirements. The federal courts have continued to exempt patentees
from the normally stringent requirements for demonstrating validity by
awarding preliminary injunctions upon a showing that the patent was
merely "more probably than not" valid provided that the defendant had
engaged in unsavory practices. 58 These cases seem to rest on an unarticu-
lated and possibly unwarranted 59 estoppel of defendants to deny the validity
of patents during the early stages of the proceedings, if they have blatantly
copied publicly disclosed inventions.60
2. Middle Twentieth Century
The elements of title, validity, infringement, and irreparable injury,
and the tests to determine them, have ostensibly remained unaltered since
the 1930's, but most courts have completed the shift to more exacting
standards to establish each element.
The courts have retained the requirement that the plaintiff's title be
established with "no reasonable doubt." The patent, an assignment, or an
exclusive license will suffice; affidavits from the party and from absent
persons will not.61
The standard of "no reasonable doubt" also applies to the patent's
validity.6 2  A prior adjudication generally satisfies this test,6 but only if
56 See American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 271-72 (2d Cir.
1959); George O'Day Associates v. Talman Corp., 206 F. Supp. 297 (D.R.I. 1962);
1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION & TRADE-MARKS §§ 16.2(d), 16.3, 16.4, at 249-61
(2d ed. 1950).
57 Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 121 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir.
1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 364 (1942).
58 Mathieu v. Mitchell Vance Co., 7 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1925) ; Milwaukee Printing
Co. v. Stover, 290 Fed. 387 (7th Cir. 1923) ("injustice to deny the motion for pre-
liminary relief"); Schaffer Belts, Inc. v. Trade Accessories, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 266
(S.D.N.Y. 1942) ("circumstances . . . are so extraordinary") ; P. L. & M. Co. v.
Ballagh, 52 F.2d 700 (S.D. Cal. 1931); Anderson Co. v. Welworth Automotive
Corp., 46 F.2d 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1931) ("presumption . . . entitled to great weight
[due to] . . .meticulous care . . . defendant [used in] copy[ing] . . . plaintiff's
device in all respects") ; W. A. Scheaffer Pen Co. v. Worth Featherweight Pen Co.,
41 F.2d 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1930) ("under such circumstances the defendant [cannot] . ..
complain"); Anderson & Writer Corp. v. Hanky Beret, Inc., 36 F.2d 412 (S.D.N.Y.
1929), rev'd on other grounds, 40 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1930); Tropic-Aire, Inc. v.
Jumper, 28 F.2d 631 (D. Minn. 1928); Hutto Eng'r Co. v. Grinder Sales Co., 18
F.2d 985 (E.D. Mich. 1927).
59 See text accompanying notes 106-10 infra.
60 If a person "blatantly copies" a patented device and the patent is subsequently
held invalid, this copying cannot be a violation of state unfair competition laws unless
the device is deceptively held out as the patentee's. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
81 See Edaco Stahlwarenfabrik Ernst Darman & Co. v. Hill Novelties Mfg. Corp.,
185 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (alternative holding).
62 See, e.g., Heyman Mfg. Co. v. Electrix Corp., 200 F. Supp. 217 (D.R.I. 1961);
Tyrolean Handbag Co. v. Empress Handbag, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Olsen v. Baby World, 120 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
63 See Radio Corp. of America v. Collins Radio Co., 13 F. Supp. 976 (D. Del.
1936) (court would not consider defendant's claim of additional prior art on patent
adjudicated valid in many prior suits) ; text accompanying note 21 supra.
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the prior suit was a fully contested adversary proceeding upon the merits
of the patent.64 A more exacting concept of public acquiescence is the
announced equivalent to a prior adjudication 5 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Better
Serv. Sewing Mach. Co.66 accurately represents the limited role currently
accorded public acquiescence.67 The court in Singer rejected plaintiff's
offer of proof, because it was "not clearly beyond dispute" that its com-
petitors desired the device but abstained believing the validity of plaintiff's
patent.68 Public acquiescence has been accepted to prove validity during
the last two decades only in the case of a "pioneer patent." 69 United
States Plywood Corp. v. Zeesman Plywood Corp.70 attached great weight
to the commercial success of the "pioneer" process during the six years
from the patent's issuance until suit and noted that the plywood industry,
except for the defendant, acquiesced by licensing it from the plaintiff.7 1
However, a showing of public acquiescence, even for a "pioneer patent" as
in United States Plywood, does not seem as convincing as a prior ad-
judication. The conclusion is unlikely that competitors have investigated
the validity of the plaintiff's patent-including such aspects as priority,
anticipation, and invention-sufficiently to have decided not to infringe
because of the strong likelihood that a court will hold the patent valid.72
The recent reluctance of courts to equate public acquiescence with validity
suggests their recognition that this inconclusive evidence does not demon-
strate a patent's validity with "no reasonable doubt." Their cautious de-
mands for a prior adversary adjudication of validity have virtually precluded
patentees from preliminarily enjoining the first infringers.
The courts have also tightened the required showing of infringement
in suits for preliminary injunctions. This strictness is manifested initially
6 4 Rosenberg v. Groov-Pin Corp., 81 F2d 46, 47 (2d Cir. 1936) :
The doctrine that in the absence of long acquiescence or adjudication an
injunction will not go, is at first blush anomalous in the light of the pre-
sumption of validity which courts generally grant to a patent once issued.
[However] . . . examiners have neither the time nor the assistance to
exhaust the prior art; nothing is more common in a suit for infringement
than to find that all the important references are turned up for the first time
by the industry of a defendant whose interest animates his search. It is a
reasonable caution not to tie the hands of a whole art until there is at least
the added assurance which comes from such an incentive.
See Blessing v. Gordon Textile, 30 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (prior adjudication
not contesting validity held not controlling).
6L See, e.g., Pacific Cage & Screen Co. v. Continental Cage Corp., 259 F.2d 87
(9th Cir. 1958) (dictum) ; United States Can Corp. v. American Can Co., 31 F. Supp.
91 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (dictum); Metropolitan Button Works, Inc. v. Jaffe, 19 F. Supp.
860 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (dictum).
66131 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
67 See also Artmoore Co. v. Dayless Mfg. Co., 100 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
68131 F. Supp. 146, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
69 A "pioneer patent" represents a decided advance over the existing state of
the art opening up a new field of endeavor. Cf. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Indus-
trial Shoe Mach. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 826, 834 (D. Mass. 1963).
70 84 F. Supp. 78 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
71Id. at 82.
72 See Rosenberg v. Groov-Pin Corp., 81 F2d 46 (2d Cir. 1936); text accom-
panying notes 21-24 supra.
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in construing the scope of the allegedly infringed patent. Despite clear
validity deriving from prior adjudication, a court may now more care-
fully examine the claims allowed in the prior adjudication to be sure that
it is "palpably and obviously clear" 73 that their scope includes the allegedly
infringing device.74 The strong showing has been described as "in effect
. the equivalent of a summary judgment . *.".." 75 Some courts
have refused even to consider the question of infringement if affidavits were
submitted from both sides.
76
Even if the complainant satisfies current requirements by establishing
title, validity, and infringement beyond a reasonable doubt,77 a preliminary
injunction no longer inevitably follows by presuming irreparable injury
from defendant's continued infringement. 78  Heyman Mfg. Co. v. Electrix
Corp.79 illustrates a denial of preliminary injunction for clear infringement
of a previously adjudicated patent, because the defendant did not establish
that "he will suffer injury during the pendency of the proceedings, which
is certain and irreparable, if the preliminary injunction is denied." 80
Irreparable injury might be indicated by a permanent loss of market posi-
tion, as manifested by loss of sales resulting from a denial of the relief.
8
1
But this loss may be difficult to establish as between habitual competitors
roughly similar in size, since the presumption is strong that their inter-
relationship will continue without an injunction until the trial on the
merits.8 2 Another portent of potential irreparable injury is a clear indica-
tion that the defendant will be financially unable to respond in damages.a8
73 Collins v. Wallin, 66 F. Supp. 687, 689 (D. Mass. 1946) ; see Owens v. Ameri-
can Sterographic Corp., 116 F. Supp. 406, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Ganter v. Unit
Venetian Blind Supply Corp., 87 F. Supp. 338 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
74 Leavitt v. McBee Co., 124 F.2d 938, 940 (1st Cir. 1942).
75 Superior Elec. Co. v. General Radio Co., 194 F. Supp. 339, 343 (D.N.J. 1961);
see 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 65.04, at 1640 (2d ed. N(55).
76 See, e.g., Superior Elec. Co. v. General Radio Corp., supra note 75, at 343;
Burroughs v. Hardee, 126 U.S.P.Q. 471 (E.D.S.C. 1960); cf. Owens v. American
Sterographic Corp., 116 F. Supp. 406, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Compare Schick Dry
Shaver, Inc. v. Nicholl, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1937) (preliminary injunc-
tion granted), aff'd, 98 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1938), with Schick Dry Shaver, Inc. v.
General Shaver Corp., 21 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1937) (preliminary injunction
denied).
77 See 3 BARRON & HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1433, at 492-93
(Wright ed. 1958).
78 Compare text accompanying notes 34-41 supra.
79 200 F. Supp. 217 (D.R.I. 1961).
so Id. at 218.
81 See Nadya, Inc. v. Majestic Metal Specialties, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
82 See Superior Elec. Co. v. General Radio Corp., 194 F. Supp. 339, 343 (D.N.J.
1961).
83 See, e.g., Owens v. American Sterographic Corp., 116 F. Supp. 406 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Collins v. Wallin, 66 F. Supp. 687 (D. Mass. 1946); Eskimo Pie Corp. v.
Arctic Fruit Ices, Inc., 15 F.2d 853 (E.D.N.Y. 1926). See also Sinko v. Casco, 89
F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1937); Penmac Corp. v. Falcon Pencil Corp., 62 F. Supp. 358
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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But, except for these two infrequent types of injury, present judicial at-
titudes generally bar findings of irreparable injury to support preliminary
equity relief by either injunction or bond.
Despite this restrictive trend in the requirements for preliminary in-
junctions, the more traditional Grand Rapids view 84 has retained vitality in
the Sixth Circuit. For example, Mueller v. Wolfinger,85 asserting that
"general principles of equity which control the granting or refusing of
preliminary injunctions apply in patent [infringement] suits," 16 resolved
a doubt as to infringement of plaintiff's clearly valid patent in favor of the
plaintiff, but offered the defendant the option of posting a bond in lieu of
the injunction. Similarly, Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Neisner
Bros.,8 7 without reference to general equitable principles, found infringe-
ment of a clearly valid previously adjudicated patent from conflicting
affidavits and granted an injunction on plaintiff's bald assertion of irre-
parable injury.88 These results recall the less stringent nineteenth century
practice.
In conjunction with the generally greater difficulty in obtaining pre-
liminary relief, plaintiffs who have not otherwise established that their
patent will be upheld upon a final trial no longer can substantiate validity
by showing only that the defendant "copied" their patented devices 8 9
In Belding Heminway Co. v. Future Fashions, Inc.,9 the Second Circuit
reversed a preliminary injunction and found that even an exact copy does
not prove the validity of a design patent. This rationale has also appeared
in decisions denying injunctions for copying ordinary patents.91 The only
recorded case during the last two decades granting a preliminary injunction
without adjudication or acquiescence 92 probably was decided upon an
"estoppel" and not a "copying" rationale, since the defendant had originally
acceded to the plaintiff's patent but then sold the infringing product through
a closely related corporation.
C. Suggested Approach
Although title, validity, infringement, and irreparable injury have
been the elements of a claim for preliminary relief for over 150 years, the
84 See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
8568 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Ohio 1946), appeal dismissed, 165 F.2d 844 (6th Cir.
1948).
8aId. at 488; see Gordon Johnson Co. v. Hunt, 109 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ohio
1952).
87 101 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
88 Id. at 928. But see Artmoore Co. v. Dayless Mfg. Co., 100 F. Supp. 110 (N.D.
Ii. 1951).
89 Compare text accompanying notes 51-60 supra.
90 143 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1944) (per curiam) ; cf. Celebrity, Inc. v. Trina, 264
F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1959); Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 121 F.2d
273 (6th Cir. 1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 364 (1942). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
91 See Zandelin v. Maxwell Bentley Mfg. Co., 197 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
cf. American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 261-68 (2d Cir. 1959).92 Schaffer Belts Co. v. Trade Accessories, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y.
1942).
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needed quantum of proof has varied, even at a given point in time. The
customary purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo.93 This goal is feasible in areas where the injunction is primarily
prohibitory, for example, one that merely restrains an alleged infringer
from using a disputed trademark until after the trial.94 But a preliminary
injunction in a patent suit tends to cause greater dislocation, since it fre-
quently requires the defendant to "suspend" a substantial investment until
the trial on the merits.9 5 Clearer articulation of the actual requirements
for preliminary relief should supplant the old rubrics.
1. No Reasonable Doubt
The strongest possible case for preliminary relief obviously occurs if
all elements are established beyond a reasonable doubt. The presence or
absence of "no reasonable doubt" concerning title-shown by patent or
assignment-and validity-presumed from a prior federal court adjudica-
tion p-is readily ascertainable by objective standards. Even the more
subjective determination of infringement has evoked judicial verbalization
that it must be "beyond question" 7 or "palpably and obviously clear" 98
alternatives to "no reasonable doubt." This showing of infringement is
fulfilled if, without construction of opposing affidavits, the defendant's
device can be shown substantially to conform to the one challenged in the
93 See, e.g., Doeskin Prods, Inc. v. United Paper Co., 195 F.2d 356 (7th Cir.
1952) ; Hoeme v. Jeoffroy, 100 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods.
Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Cal. 1953); 7 MOORE, FmmDiAL
PRACTICE 1 65.04 (2d ed. 1955).
The term "status quo" ordinarily refers to the last actual peaceable, non-
contested status of the parties to the controversy which preceded the pending
suit and which should be preserved until a final decree can be entered.
The preservation of status quo should not be confused with the economic
stabilization of a whole industry, as compared with the restoration or at-
tempted restoration of competition within such industry.
Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., supra at 734. See also Note,
Temporary Injunctive Relief Under Section 10(l) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 111 U.
PA. L. REv. 460, 480 (1963).
94 See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495 (2d
Cir. 1962); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Western Printing & Lithographing Co., 112
F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1940). Similarly, preliminary injunctions are granted upon a
"prima facie" showing of copyright infringement without a showing of irreparable
injury. See, e.g., Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1955); American
Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 Fed. 829, 835 (2d Cir. 1922) ; Royalty Designs, Inc. v.
Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 204 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.D. 1962); cf. Boosey v. Empire
Music Co., 224 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (bond in lieu of injunction).
95 "[W]hile ordinarily a preliminary injunction aims to preserve the status quo
pending suit, in a patent case like this it may be said to destroy it." A. B. Dick Co. v.
Barnett, 277 Fed. 423, 425 (2d Cir. 1921).
96A determination of validity in one suit is not conclusive upon a subsequent
suit upon the same patent between different parties. Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S.
638, 642-48 (1936); Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1955). See also
STAFF OF SUBCOMiar. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss., AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT LITIGATION STATISTICS
5 (Comm. Print 1961).
97 See Pacific Cage & Screen Co. v. Continental Cage Corp., 259 F.2d 87 (9th
Cir. 1958); Heyman Mfg. Co. v. Electrix Corp., 200 F. Supp. 217 (D.R.I. 1961).
98 Collins v. Wallin, 66 F. Supp. 687 (D. Mass. 1946).
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prior adjudication of validity relied upon by plaintiff.99 Similarly subjective
is an estimation that neither a permanent injunction nor damages will cure
plaintiff's injury. To demonstrate such irreparable injury plaintiff must
convince the court either that by the time of permanent injunction his
business will be irretrievably lost or that the strong probability of defend-
ant's insolvency in the near future destroys the value (f the ultimate award
of damages plaintiff expects. If plaintiff's market position is substantial, he
probably will not be able to show that the alleged infringer's activity over
the next few years will alone cause irreparable loss of market position.1° °
Moreover, if both plaintiff and defendant are economically viable entities
an accounting for infringement may amply compensate the plaintiff for his
loss of monopoly power until final decision on the merits. A defendant
carrying on a substantial business will probably be able to respond to any
judgment for damages. Therefore, a showing of irreparable injury should
occur in only those few situations involving either a demonstrably weak
plaintiff or defendant. No preliminary injunction case reported in the past
two decades has contained such a showing.101
Even if the plaintiff's claim for-relief is validated beyond a reasonable
doubt, courts still may exercise their "sound discretion" to deny an in-
junction. Courts should not limit plaintiff to a bond instead of an injunction
because of defendant's contention that harm to him is as great as that to
the plaintiff. If all elements are proven without reasonable doubt, a pre-
liminary injunction should be withheld in favor of bond only in cases of
disproportionately severe injury to defendant 0 2 or of extreme public
hardship. 0 3
2. Reasonable Cause To Believe
Plaintiffs who cannot establish each element of their case beyond a
reasonable doubt should not be foreclosed from preliminary injunctive relief
if there is only "reasonable cause to believe" part of the case. Title should
always be held to a "no reasonable doubt" standard, because drastic relief
seems inappropriate if title is questionable. Moreover, if there is only
"reasonable cause to believe" more than one of the other elements, pre-
liminary injunctive relief should be denied. If each of the four elements of
plaintiff's claim was established beyond reasonable doubt, the probability
of plaintiff's overall success at the final trial is very nearly as certain.
Thus, if the court were "99 percent sure" that each element existed given
99 See Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. Gardner Sign Co., 39 F.2d 487 (W.D. Pa.
1929); Radio Corp. of America v. Collins Radio Co., 13 F. Supp. 976 (D. Del. 1936).
See also Western Elec. Co. v. Cinema Supplies, Inc., 80 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1935).
100 Superior Elec. Co. v. Gen. Radio Corp., 194 F. Supp. 339, 343, 347 (D.N.J.
1961),
0 'OBut cf. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Neisner Bros., 101 F. Supp. 926
(N.D. Ill. 1951).
102 See cases cited notes 130-31 infra.
103 See cases cited notes 132-35 infra.
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the circumstances proven by the plaintiff, the court could be confident
that the necessary combination of the four elements could also be demon-
strated. However, if a court has only "reasonable cause to believe" an
element exists, there is substantial, though not controlling, doubt about the
result at trial. The likelihood that two elements proven to this lesser
degree of certainty have occurred in combination is appreciably less than
that either has occurred individually. Thus, if the claim of validity is based
only on public acquiescence, then the court must both construe the un-
adjudicated patent's scope and determine whether defendant infringed the
patent as construed. Unless the devices are virtually identical, affirmative
findings of both validity and infringement would not support a conclusion
of "reasonable cause to believe" that a valid patent has been infringed.
Since it is proper to grant preliminary relief if one of the necessary
elements is established under a "reasonable cause to believe" standard while
the others are proven "with no reasonable doubt," a close analysis of the
former standard follows.
a. Validity
A "reasonable cause to believe" that the patent is valid arises from a
showing of "public acquiescence"--clear proof that knowledgeable people
refrained from infringing because of the probability of the patent's
validity.'- 4 Any lesser showing of validity would have to rely on the bare
statutory presumption of validity, which simply shifts the burden of per-
suasion but lacks probative force to demonstrate reasonable cause to believe
that the patent is valid.10 5 However, in this circumstance many courts
have awarded plaintiffs preliminary injunctions when defendants have
blatantly copied.'0 6 But even exact duplication may be simply a "challenge
to monopoly boldly asserted by the infringer on behalf of himself and the
public,"'01 7 and it certainly does not strengthen the statutory presumption of
validity sufficiently to support preliminary relief.'0 8 If the unfairness of the
defendant's conduct moves a court of equity to grant injunctive relief to
dispel defendant's unreasonable advantage, the court should accurately
characterize its result as following from an estoppel of the defendant. 0 9
The analogous doctrine in the law of unfair competition prevents a person
who has stolen a trade secret from using it, even after its public dissemina-
104 See generally notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
105 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1958).
106 See cases cited note 58 supra.
107 Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 121 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir.
1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 364 (1942). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225 (1964).
108 See Zandlin v. Maxwell Bentley Mfg. Co., 197 F.Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(preliminary injunction under patent statute and common-law unfair competition
denied; preliminary injunction granted under the Lanham Act).
109 Cf. Schaffer Belts, Inc. v. Trade Accessories, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y.
1942).
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tion by a patent that is subsequently held invalid, so that it is available
to all the world except this wrongdoer.110
b. Infringement
A court may have "reasonable cause to believe" that the plaintiff's
patent has been infringed on the basis of affidavits submitted by both sides
to construe the bounds of the patent.-" This finding most commonly occurs
when the complainant relies upon a previously adjudicated patent so that
the court also has before it the scope defined in prior litigation. In some
cases, a substantial doubt that defendant's device is infringing may also cast
suspicion on plaintiff's claim that he will be irreparably injured by the de-
fendant driving him out of business, since significantly different devices are
less likely to be economic substitutes31
c. Irreparable or Comparative Injury
Even if title, validity, and infringement are proven with "no reasonable
doubt," the plaintiff should not receive equity relief without at least a pre-
liminary showing of "reasonable cause to believe" that he will suffer
irreparable injury. If his case on the merits had been conclusive, he would
have won an injunction on summary judgment." 3 "Reasonable cause to
believe" irreparable injury by loss of market position or defendant's finan-
cial insolvency is not readily generalized into an abstract test; predicting
the shifting fortunes of apparently viable businesses like the plaintiff's or
defendant's for the interval until trial is a highly speculative basis for
judicial action. However, certain recurring situations illustrate showings
of "reasonable cause to believe" that irreparable injury will occur.
Unless a plaintiff patentee who makes and sells his patented product
is much smaller than the defendant infringer, he probably will not be able
to prove the irreparable loss of market position that he expects upon denial
of preliminary injunction. But if the court has "no reasonable doubt" that
he will recover upon a final trial, it should try to deter overreaching in-
fringers from capitalizing on the unpredictable amount of his injury. Due
to the strict standards of proof in a judicial accounting," 4 it is an over-
simplification to assume that the plaintiff can be completely compensated
for the defendant's infringement despite a successful trial on the merits.
Especially elusive is a measure of full compensation that isolates from the
110 See Note, Relief in Trade Secret Cases After Patent Publication, 5 PATENT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUcATiox 70 (1962). See also TURNER,
LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 437-59 (1962) ; Maruchnics, Industrial Trade Secrets, Their
Use and Protection, 4 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 69 (1955).
ll See Minnesota Mining & Alfg. Co-v. Neisner Bros., 101 F, Supp. 926 (N.D.
Ill. 1951) ; Schick Dry Shaver, Inc. v. Motoshaver, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Cal.
1937), aff'd, 100 F.2d 236 (1938).
112 Cf. Mueller v. Wolfinger, 68 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Ohio 1946), appeal dismissed,
165 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1948).
13 See Rubinstein v. Silex Co., 73 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
114 See Note, Recovery in Patent Infringement Snits, 60 COLUM.. L. REV. 840,
855-56 (1960). See also Note, Enforcement of Rights Against Patent Infringers,
72 HARV. L. REV. 328, 34849 (1958).
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congeries of market influences the "intangible" loss of market position
anticipated from the infringer's competition until trial. This loss generally
cannot be brought within the traditional alternative damage tests of rea-
sonable royalty, loss of patentee's profits, or profits made by the infringer."
5
The probability of intangible loss to a plaintiff who "works" his
patent, if supported by some credible evidence of loss of market position,
should justify a presumption of "reasonable cause to believe" irreparable
injury that warrants equity relief. Although the plaintiff's case is not
strong enough for injunction, a court might not hesitate to offer the defend-
ant the alternative of posting a bond to cover the eventual damages. A
bond would not increase the plaintiff's eventual judgment, but it assures
defendant's ability to pay. Moreover, the direct cost of the bond," 6 the
impact on defendant's credit standing, and the psychological deterrent of
being immediately brought to task should prevent infringements of clearly
valid patents to the extent that these infringements are encouraged solely
by the expectation that plaintiff will never be able to recover his intangible
losses.
If the patentee does not make or sell the patented article, but profits
only from its "royalty value," courts need not presume "reasonable cause
to believe" irreparable injury and enjoin or substitute a bond, even though
every element except irreparable injury is established with "no reasonable
doubt." This plaintiff will suffer no intangible loss of market position. He
desires preliminary relief only to insure the extraction of high royalties,"
7
but a reasonable royalty for the infringing period should be recoverable as
damages." 8 Therefore, the "good-faith" infringing defendant, especially
one who has invested in plant and equipment in reliance on the legality of
his actions, if financially solvent, should be able successfully to resist a
preliminary injunction sought by a nonusing patentee.
115 See authorities cited note 114 supra. Although "the court may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed," 35 U.S.C. §284 (1958),
the courts have used this provision not to compensate for "intangibles," but only to
punish "willful infringers." See Note, Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits, 60
COLUm. L. REV. 840, 852-53 (1960).
116 "[T]he Surety companies require, save in exceptional cases, [negotiable
securities, cash, or government bonds] . . . in an amount equal to the entire sum at
risk." FIRE, CASUALTY & SURETY BuLLETiNs, CASUALTY & SURETY SEcTION BONDS
C-8 (3d printing Sept. 1948). If the defendant is considered to be an adequate risk,
the cost may be $20 per $1,000 per annum, with a 50% reduction in premium if the
face amount is fully secured by cash or United States government bonds. Ibid.;
Interview With Representative of Standard Accident Insurance Company, Philadel-
phia, Pa., Feb. 26, 1964, who quoted from standard rates given by the Surety Asso-
ciation of America, New York, N.Y.
117 If the nonusing patentee took out his patent only to "block" technological
advances of his competitors, arguably he is irreparably injured by the infringement.
But regardless of whether he can show this "irreparable injury" with "no reasonable
doubt," public policy would probably discourage a court of equity from enjoining the
alleged infringer who attempts to design around this patent. See Powell, The Exclu-
sive Right of the Patentee-Should the Right or Power To Exclude Others Be
Dependent on Sale or Licensing by the Patentee?, 58 HARv. L. REV. 726 (1945).
See also Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806 (1945).
118 See Note, Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits, 60 COLUm. L. REV. 840,
848 (1960).
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Another type of potential irreparable injury that is difficult to prove
"beyond a reasonable doubt" flows from an infringement occurring when
the plaintiff's seventeen-year monopoly has but a few years to run. 1 9
Even if the patentee is successful in a final trial, a permanent injunction
will be unavailable since his patent will then have expired. 2  The infringer,
who during a period of infringement became entrenched in his competitive
position at the expense of the patentee, can continue to exploit this unlawful
advantage. Thus, he has shortened the life of the patentee's monopoly by
exchanging his liability for damages for a judicial compulsory license.
Therefore, if the plaintiff can introduce some credible evidence to show that
this competitive situation exists and if there is "no reasonable doubt" as to
title, validity, and infringement, the court could reasonably presume that
the plaintiff will sustain injury by this shortening of his monopoly beyond
that curable by damages after a final trial. A preliminary injunction
should be granted.
A patentee of an invention with such a short useful life that it will
undoubtedly be worthless at the completion of the trial on the merits is not
also entitled to this presumption of "reasonable cause to believe" irreparable
injury. The owner of a novelty patent will not lose a continuing "in-
tangible" market position after the final trial, since he will probably not
then be exploiting his patent. In any case his permanent injunction will
preclude the defendant from competition for the life of the patent. More-
over, this novelty patentee can recover damages for the intervening period
like any other patentee, so his argument of irreparability should at most
entitle him to a bond in lieu of injunction. Although the patent laws do not
consider the social utility of patents in authorizing the relief available to
the patentee,1 2 1 if this "one-price" aspect of the patent system should change,
the limited usefulness of plaintiff's device would argue for less rather than
more patent protection.
Incisive economic judgments are essential to the framing of appro-
priate orders. In addition, the freer use of bond in lieu of injunction could
frequently provide greater flexibility in accommodating plaintiff's right to
relief with the good-faith defendant's desire to avoid extreme financial
hardship.
III. PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST INFRINGERS
A. The Early Standards
When a court of equity after full trial has found a patent valid and
infringed, it must frame an adequate decree for relief. By the middle of the
119 See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS, SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESs., AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT LITIGATION
STATISTICS 3 (Comm. Print 1961).
120 See, e.g., Freedman v. Friedman, 242 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1957); Jordan v.
Hemphill Co., 180 F2d 457 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Hughes Tool Co. v. A. F. Spengler Co.,
73 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Okla. 1947), appeal dismissed, 169 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1948) ;
cf. Royal-McBee Corp. v. Smith-Corona Marchant, Inc., 295 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961).
121 See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
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nineteenth century, courts generally recognized that the plaintiff was en-
titled to both an accounting for past damages 122 and an injunction against
future infringements for the life of the patent.123 Because the permanent
injunction for the life of the patent 124 was considered the only remedy 125
adequate to protect the plaintiff's "right to exclude others from making,
using or selling his invention," 126 it was often granted as a matter of
course. 12 7 However, the exercise of judicial discretion in equity gave rise
to two exceptions in addition to the traditional equitable defenses of
laches 128 and estoppel.1
29
The first exception, based on the parties' relative injuries, permitted
the court to stay the injunction and award only damages if the defendant
could establish that his hardship under an injunction would materially out-
weigh the plaintiff's benefits, including his desire to preserve his statutory
monopoly. 30 For example, in Dorsey Harvester Revolving Rake Co. v.
M1arsh,1, 13 since the plaintiff did not manufacture his device and the de-
fendant in good faith had invested large sums that would be lost if he were
enjoined, the court stayed the injunction and granted the plaintiff the usual
damages for the loss of his statutory monopoly. In practical effect these
decisions instituted judicial compulsory licensing by substituting for an
injunction reasonable compensation for use of plaintiff's invention.
The second exception to the routine enjoining of infringers occurred
when the court found that an injunction would sufficiently impair the
122 See Parks v. Booth, 102 U.S. 96 (1880).
123 See, e.g., American Cotton-Tie Supply Co. v. McCready, 1 Fed. Cas. 631
(No. 295) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) ; Cook v. Ernest, 6 Fed. Cas. 385 (No. 3155) (D.C.
D. La. 1872) ; Potter v. Mack, 19 Fed. Cas. 1166 (No. 11331) (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1868);
Woodworth v. Stone, 30 Fed. Cas. 593 (No. 18021) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
124 See, e.g., Bignall v. Harvey, 4 Fed. 334, 337 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1880); Jordan
v. Dobson, 13 Fed. Cas. 1092 (No. 7519) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1870). See also Westing-
house v. Carpenter, 43 Fed. 894 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1888).
125 The courts have recognized their power to destroy the infringing articles but
have not seen fit to resort to such a drastic remedy. See Note, Patents, Copyrights
and Trade Secrets-Destruction of Infringing Instruments Owned by Infringer, 35
MIcH. L. REv. 1350 (1937).
12635 U.S.C. § 154 (1958).
127 See cases cited notes 122-24 supra.
128 See, e.g., Imperial Chem. Mfg. Co. v. Stein, 69 Fed. 616 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895),
aff'd, 77 Fed. 612 (2d Cir. 1896) ; Atlantic Giant Powder Co. v. Rand, 2 Fed. Cas.
147 (No. 626) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); Goodyear v. Honsingen, 10 Fed. Cas. 692
(No. 5572) (C.C.N.D. Ili. 1867). See also Gillons v. Shell Co., 86 F.2d 600 (9th
Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 689 (1937).
129 See Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888). See also Royal-McBee v.
Smith-Corona, Inc., 295 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961).
130 See Barnard v. Gibson, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 649 (1849); Hoe v. Knap, 27
Fed. 204, 212 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886) ; Sanders v. Logan, 21 Fed. Cas. 321 (No. 12295)
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1861); Hoe v. Boston Daily Advertiser Corp., 14 Fed. 914, 916
(C.C.D. Mass. 1883) (dictum) ; cf. Colgate v. Western Union Tel. Co., 6 Fed. Cas.
85, 97 (No. 2995) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1878). But cf. Norton v. Eagle Automatic Can
Co., 57 Fed. 929 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1893) (preliminary injunction) ; Consolidated Roller-
Mill Co. v. Coombs, 39 Fed. 803 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1889).
131 7 Fed. Cas. 939, 945 (No. 4014) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1873) ; see McCrary v. Penn-
sylvania Canal Co., 5 Fed. 367 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1880), aff'd, 141 U.S. 459 (1891).
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"public interest" to warrant money damages in lieu of injunction.13 2 The
relative injuries to the parties then became irrelevant. In Bliss v.
Brooklyn,133 the court accordingly denied an injunction because the with-
drawal of the infringing hose couplings, which were "necessary for the daily
use of the city in the prevention of fires," 134 would cause great public
inconvenience. A modification of this rationale occurred in Thacher v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 35 where the court allowed the city to continue using
the original infringing concrete structure but awarded the plaintiff damages
and enjoined future infringements.
B. Shifts in the Application of These Standards
1. Early Twentieth Century
Electric Smelting & Ahminum Co. v. Carborundum Co.136 extended
the Dorsey rationale to the situation in which both plaintiff and defendants
were manufacturers in different industries, It stayed the injunction and
only awarded damages since
it is not therefore the case of willful and deliberate entry by an
infringer into competition with an established business . . . but
it is the use in good faith of the Cowles process in a branch of in-
dustry which the patentee was not then and has not since
occupied.'
37
The vitality of the "nonuser" aspect of the "relative injuries to the
parties" test was soon questioned and possibly destroyed in Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. (Paper Bag Patent Case).
138
A manufacturer of paper bags, who had patented a machine for manufac-
turing bags, sued a competing manufacturer for infringement, although the
patentee was not using the machine himself. After losing on the issues
of validity and infringement, the defendant resisted an injunction on the
rationale that the "public interest" required a patentee who admittedly
intended neither use nor licensing of his patent to offer it to other manu-
facturers on reasonable terms. The Supreme Court, however, found noth-
ing in the Constitution or the patent laws requiring denial of injunction
because of nonuse:
We have seen that it has been the judgment of Congress from the
beginning that the sciences and the useful arts could be best ad-
132 See Ballard v. City of Pittsburgh, 12 Fed. 783 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1882). Bui
see Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Union Ry., 78 Fed. 365 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896).
133 3 Fed. Cas. 706 (No. 1544) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1871).
134 Id. at 709.
135219 Fed. 909 (D. Md. 1915), aff'd, 230 Fed. 1022 (4th Cir. 1916).
136 189 Fed. 710 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1900), reed on otler grounds, 203 Fed. 976 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 231 U.S. 754 (1913).
137 Id. at 713.
138 210 U.S. 405 (1908). Mr. Justice Harlan dissented on grounds of public
policy.
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vanced by giving an exclusive right to an inventor. . . . Con-
gress has not "overlooked the subject of non-user of patented
inventions." . . . In some foreign countries the right granted
to an inventor is affected by non-use. This policy, we must
assume, Congress has not been ignorant of nor of its effects. It
has, nevertheless, selected another policy; it has continued that
policy through many years. We may assume that experience
has demonstrated its wisdom and beneficial effect upon the arts
and sciences. 39
But the Court did note that the right to exclude the patentee's immediate
competitor from using the invention was the most reasonable protection
of the patent,' 40 and the Court carefully limited the decision to the situation
of directly competing parties.
Despite these caveats, most courts accepted this case as generally limit-
ing their power to refuse injunctions, at least in circumstances of plaintiff's
nonuse of the patent.' 4 ' No court'during the next three decades substituted
a bond for a permanent injunction upon a "relative injuries" rationale.
42
The Paper Bag Patent Case did not affect the availability of the "public
injury" exception.1
43
2. Middle Twentieth Century
Two cases decided during the nineteen thirties seemed to recognize
the Electric Smelting line of cases denying an injunction against a non-
competing user of the device. In Curtiss Aerocar Co. v. Springer,
1' 4 the
court refused to enjoin a defendant who was using a car that infringed the
plaintiff's patent, provided the defendant paid damages to the plaintiff.
Similarly, in Nerney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
145 an injunction was
conditioned on nonpayment of damages by the defendant railroad using
infringing coupling devices. Despite these two cases, however, permanent
injunctions continued to be granted as a matter of course.
146
139 Id. at 429-30.
140 Ibid.
141 See cases cited note 150 infra.
'
4 2 But cf. Landis Tool Co. v. Ingle, 286 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1923) (preliminary
injunction).
143 Se e Thacher v. Mayor of Baltimore, 219 Fed. 909 (D. Md. 1915), aff'd, 230
Fed. 1022 (4th Cir. 1916).
144 81 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1936). See American Safety Device Co. v. Kurland
Chem. Co., 68 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1934) (dictum).
145 83 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1936).
146 See, e.g., J. R. Clark Co. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 186 F. Supp. 22,
28-29 (S.D. Ind. 1960), aff'd, 288 F.2d 279 (1961); R. Wallace & Sons Mfg. Co. v.
Ellmore Silver Co., 91 F. Supp. 703, 705 (D. Conn. 1950); Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Pax Plastics Corp., 65 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ill. 1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d
554 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Balban v. Polyfoto Corp., 47 F. Supp. 472, 480 (D. Del. 1942) ;
Barnett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 56 F.2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), aff'd, 56 F.2d 420
(2d Cir. 1932). But cf. Condenser Corp. of America v. Micamold Radio Corp., 145
F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 861 (1945).
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In Special Equip. Co. v. Coe,147 the Supreme Court did not rule
on an argument by the Commissioner of Patents that the patent in question
should not issue because the patentee intended to suppress it, since the evi-
dence failed to establish this intentionY.4  However, three dissenting jus-
tices would have found intent to suppress and would have outlawed it by
overruling the Paper Bag Patent Case as inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and the patent laws. 49 But this dissent has not generated further
judicial questioning of the Paper Bag nullification of the "relative injuries"
test during the subsequent two decades.'50
The "public interest" exception to the automatic enjoining of in-
fringers is probably still available to courts. For example, in City of
Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc.,5 1 the Seventh Circuit dissolved an
injunction that would have affected the sewage disposal for the city of
Milwaukee to avoid endangering the public health and safety.
52
C. A Suggested Standard
The Paper Bag Patent Case, favoring broad protection of statutory
patent monopolies, removed most of the federal courts' discretion to refuse
permanent injunctions on the basis of the parties' comparative injuries.
53
A plaintiff should now always receive a permanent injunction upon proof
of infringement of his valid patent, unless the defendant can bring himself
within one of the narrow exceptions permitting denial of this relief.
1. Grossly Disparate Hardship
Despite the usual disregard of the parties' comparative injuries, a court
of equity should mitigate the harsh public policy of enjoining all infringe-
ments by retaining at least the limited discretion to deny some injunctions
that impose severe hardship on the infringer, if only slight injury to the
147 324 U.S. 370 (1945).
148 1d. at 375.
149 Id. at 381 (Douglas, Black, and Murphy, JJ., dissenting); see Powell, The
Exclusive Right of the Patentee--Should the Right or Power To Exclude Others
Be Dependent on Sale or Licensing by the Patentee?, 58 HAxv. L. REv. 726 (1945) ;
93 U. PA. L. REv. 456 (1945). See generally Frost, Legal Incidents of Non-Use of
Patented Inventions Reconsidered, 14 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 273 (1946).
150 See, e.g., Well Surveys, Inc. v. McCullough Tool Co., 199 F. Supp. 374 (N.D.
Okla. 1961); Hartford Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. E. F. Drew & Co., 188 F. Supp.
353 (D. Del. 1960), aff'd, 290 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 825 (1961) ;
Zysset v. Popeil Bros., 167 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ill. 1958), affd, 276 F.2d 354 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 826 (1960). "It is well settled that it is the exclusive
privilege of the owner of a patent monopoly to permit the use of his patent or de-
liberately keep his invention out of use during the life of the patent regardless of
his motive." Leuschner v. Kuther, 314 F.2d 71, 73 (9th Cir. 1963).
15169 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1934).
152Accord, Cincinnati Car Co. v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 37 F.2d 100
(2d Cir. 1930) (per curiam); cf. Nerney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 83 F.2d
409, 411 (2d Cir. 1936). But cf. Electro Bleaching Gas Co. v. Village of Garden
City, 33 F.2d 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
153 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
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patentee would ensue. The court's inquiry might balance the loss to the
defendant's existing investment against the loss of plaintiff's expected
profits, and also investigate the defendant's good faith and possible sup-
pression of the patent by the plaintiff.
In the Paper Bag Patent Case, involving competing manufacturers,
the nonusing patentee might have suffered substantial injury if his infring-
ing competitor used the patented device. The patentee's desire to suppress
the patent to avoid competitive injury-a legitimate use of his patent posi-
tion under existing law ' 54-was properly respected. Similarly, if the de-
fendant's infringing activity is the repeated sale of the patented device,
denial of injunction effectively enforces a compulsory license upon the
patentee and emasculates his statutory "right to exclude" by preventing
negotiation of satisfactoy licensing agreements thereafter. This injury
also should sustain an injunction regardless of the magnitude of injury to
the infringer. But a patentee who is not a manufacturer or who does not
manufacture in the defendant's field 155 will suffer no harm to his underlying
business interest if he is forced to license the device for defendant's use on
reasonable terms, including a component of monopoly profit. If the good-
faith infringer uses the patented item but does not offer it for sale, the plain-
tiff's harm, if injunction were denied, would be confined to his inability to
extract royalties from the defendant beycnd the amount allowed by the
court. In this circumstance a court might justifiably refuse an injunction
that would severely harm the defendant-such as one that would render
worthless an expensive device or system innocently made only for defend-
ant's own use, but which later is found to incorporate a feature that in-
fringes plaintiff's patent. The plaintiff's right to enjoin other potential
and actual infringers would not be curtailed.
2. The Public Interest
Use of the vague phrase "public interest" rarely substantiates the ap-
propriateness of a decision. In fact the congressional mandate to enjoin
patent infringements focused judicial attention in early patent cases on the
rights of the parties with little emphasis on "public interest" extrinsic to
the patent laws.Y56 But under the twentieth century view, "courts of equity
may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right
asserted contrary to the public interest .. ., 157
.54 See Leuschner v. Kuther, 314 F.2d 71, 73 (9th Cir. 1963).
155 See cases cited notes 130-31 supra.
156 See Sickels v. Tileson, 22 Fed. Cas. 77 (No. 12837) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1857)
(preliminary injunction); cf. Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka
Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288, 294 (6th Cir. 1896).
157 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942). See gen-
erally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMPULSORY LICENSING UNDER ANTI-TRUST
JUDGMENTS (Comm. Print 1960) ; Folk, The Relation of Patents to the Antitrust
Laws, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 278 (1948) ; Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine
in Infringement Suits, 9 U.C.L.A.L. R-v. 76 (1962).
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Only the specific context of litigation can give content to the "public
interest" protected by denying an injunction. Decisions concerning "mis-
uses" of patents as in industry-wide price fixing under a patent license,
158
or through licensing agreements tied to the purchase or license of other
articles,159 accommodate the patent laws to the antitrust laws under the
"public interest" rubric to deprive a wrongdoing patentee of both injunction
and damages against an equally reprehensible infringer. In Morton Salt
Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.,L60 the patentee leased his patented machines on
condition that only his salt tablets be used in them. This abuse of the patent
monopoly-protecting a market for another unpatented product---disquali-
fied the patentee from maintaining an infringement suit, "regardless of
whether the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the
patent." 161
But "public interest" also has described considerations wholly internal
to the patent laws. If an identifiable inconvenience to the public-such as
widespread danger to health and safety caused by reconstruction of a public
sewage facility 162 -would follow an injunction against the infringement,
a court of equity might award the patentee only damages. Contrary to the
"misuse" situation, the patentee has done nothing wrong to impel a court
to withhold all relief. Rather, the court's task is to reconcile his relief
with the public interest. The patentee's loss is not very substantial if the
infringer is not a competitor but only a mere user from whom the plaintiff
can recover monetary damages for the loss of his monopoly. The addi-
tional factor of great inconvenience then might overcome the patentee's
statutory "right" to exclusive monopoly. The patentee's only remedy would
be damages measured by a reasonable royalty.
However, the "public interest" concept does not authorize denial of
injunction to all patentees who neither use nor permit use of their inven-
tions, even on payment of reasonable royalties.163 "Nonuse" by a patentee,
however undesirable in terms of general policy, is distinguishable both from
patent "misuse" that affirmatively offends identifiable antitrust legislative
policies and from determinable public inconvenience that may be balanced
158 See Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir.
1956); cf. United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); United States v. Line Material
Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). But cf. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476
(1926). See generally Nicoson, supra note 157; Oppenheim, Patents and Antitrust:
Peaceful Coexistence, 54 Micn. L. REv. 199 (1955).
'59 See American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 154 F. Supp. 890
(D. Del.), aff'd, 268 F.2d 769 (1957). See also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), and its legislative response, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1958).
See generally Note, Contributory Infringement and Misuse-The Effect of Section
271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 66 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1953).
160 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
161 Id. at 494.
162 See City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1934).
163 But see Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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by an equity court against the patentee's diminution of monopoly control.
Any sanctions against nonuse generally are more properly addressed to
Congress as a plea for compulsory licensing of unused patents.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal equity power in patent infringement suits has required in-
creasingly more persuasive showings of title, validity, infringement, and
irreparable injury to support temporary injunctive relief. Moreover, upon
proof of title, infringement, and validity at final trial, courts have invariably
granted permanent injunctions, save in the very narrow areas of grossly
disparate harm and public inconvenience. The supposed impropriety of
presently available injunctive relief 164 has contributed to the myriad of
unsuccessful compulsory licensing proposals 165 generally addressed to re-
moving the right to exclude by injunction from the patentee's arsenal of
weapons. These proposals have included compulsory licensing of all
patents 166 and compulsory licensing of only those patents necessary for
national defense or the public welfare. 16 7 Imaginative exercise of present
federal court power to grant "injunctions in accordance with the principles
of equity" 168 has also been suggested to provide judicially dispensed com-
pulsory licensing, applied flexibly depending upon the circumstances of the
case. 169 But except in areas of specific overriding public interest, the long-
entrenched stress on not impairing the patentee's right to exclude has
overshadowed the diffused and disputed public interest in immediate in-
troduction of all technological advances into the economy. Courts, jus-
tifiably reluctant to permit their own social and economic views to ameliorate
the application of permanent injunctive relief, have left such revolutionary
inroads to the legislature.
Herbert F. Schwartz
164 See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESs., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM 44-80 (Comm. Print 1958). But see STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PAT-
ENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 8 6 TH CONG.,
2D SEss., THE PATENT SYSTEM: ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BASIS 20-25 (Comm.
Print 1960).
165See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTS
-A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1-27 (Comm. Print 1958). See also STAFF OF SUBCOMM.
ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH
CONG., 2D SESS., COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTS UNDER SOME NON-AMERICAN
SYSTEMS 1-51 (Comm. Print 1958).
166 E.g., H.R. 9259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1938); S. 2116, H.R. 8776, 62d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1911).
167 E.g., H.R. 3762, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1943); S. 2303, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1942).
168 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1958).
169 See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 8 4TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE PATENT SYSTEM AND THE
MODERN ECONOMY 28-34 (Comm. Print 1957). Stedman, Invention and Public Policy,
12 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 649, 668-71 (1947).
